States Move to Exempt ALPR Data From Public Records Laws

States Move to Exempt ALPR Data From Public Records Laws Journalists used open records requests to reveal the full scope of license plate reader networks. Now the states running those networks want to exempt themselves from public records laws entirely. How DeFlock Exposed the Network The DeFlock project is an open-source, crowdsourced tool that maps automated license plate reader (ALPR) cameras — primarily Flock Safety devices — by scraping publicly available data and accepting community submissions. The project tags camera locations on OpenStreetMap, identifying the make, model, and direction of each device. As of 2026, DeFlock has mapped nearly 75,000 ALPRs across the United States. DeFlock works by combining open-source intelligence with user reports. The project uses OpenStreetMap's Overpass API to query tagged ALPR nodes, crowdsources new sightings through its web app, and cross-references public contracts and government transparency portals. Flock Safety has responded with legal threats and technical countermeasures, including adding anti-scraping protections and pushing for legislation that would make it a crime to publish camera locations. The transparency worked. The public learned what was being built. Documents obtained through FOIA requests revealed the scope of license plate reader data broker marketplaces operating with almost no legal constraint. The Legislative Crackdown In response to this wave of transparency, multiple states introduced legislation to: Exempt ALPR data from public records requests Classify surveillance camera locations as law enforcement sensitive Prohibit disclosure of data sharing agreements with federal agencies Create criminal penalties for publishing surveillance infrastructure maps At least nine states introduced bills in 2025-2026 that would carve out ALPR data from sunshine laws. Some proposals go further, making it a misdemeanor to publish the location of surveillance cameras — effectively criminalizing the same journalism that revealed these systems to the public. The specific bills include: Florida (HB 973 / SB 1490): Exempts ALPR data and camera locations from Florida's public records law, adding to the state's 1,000+ existing FOIA exemptions. Arizona (SB 1256): Classifies ALPR camera locations as security-sensitive and exempts all captured plate data from public review, allowing access only by law enforcement or subpoena. Texas (HB 2690): Limits disclosure of surveillance technology agreements between police departments and private vendors like Flock Safety. Washington (SB 6002): Passed and signed into law in March 2026, this bill exempts ALPR data from the Public Records Act while restricting federal agency access — a compromise that privacy advocates argue eliminates oversight without preventing abuse. California, New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Michigan also saw ALPR secrecy bills introduced. Virginia passed an ALPR law in 2025 restricting out-of-state data sharing, but a January 2026 Virginia State Crime Commission report found that one in five agencies using ALPRs still retain data longer than the legal 21-day limit, and nine admitted sharing data with federal agencies in violation of state law. Flock Safety's Lobbying Machine Flock Safety has spent heavily to shape the legislative environment. According to OpenSecrets data, Flock spent $690,000 on federal lobbying in 2025 alone through firms like BGR Group, hiring lobbyists with revolving-door connections to government. State-level lobbying spending brings Flock's total influence expenditure well past $5 million since 2020. The company has hired former police chiefs and public safety officials as lobbyists and strategic advisors. Their primary argument: disclosing camera locations threatens officer and community safety by allowing criminals to map surveillance blind spots. Critics counter that this argument is self-serving — the same information Flock wants to keep secret is essential for communities to verify that the surveillance network operates within legal and ethical boundaries. Flock Safety's valuation has grown to $8.4 billion as of April 2026, backed by Andreessen Horowitz and other venture capital firms. The company processes over 20 billion vehicle scans per month across 6,000+ communities. The Journalism That Forced the Issue The current transparency crackdown is a direct reaction to investigative journalism that used open records laws to expose the surveillance network: 404 Media's FOIA to ICE: In 2024-2025, 404 Media filed public records requests revealing that ICE and CBP had accessed Flock Safety's nationwide camera network, running thousands of searches. The reporting showed that federal immigration enforcement had tapped into local police ALPR data, often without local agencies' knowledge or consent. ACLU of Massachusetts: The ACLU filed open records requests with 80+ police departments across the state and found that Flock's standard contract language gives the company a "worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free right and license" to disclose agency data to law enforcement nationwide — even when a local department believes it has opted out of data sharing. The ACLU's mapping revealed that Massachusetts police data had been searched by agencies in Florida, Texas, and elsewhere. EFF's Atlas of Surveillance: The Atlas of Surveillance, a project of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, has documented over 15,000 police surveillance technology deployments across 5,500+ jurisdictions, including ALPR systems, drones, facial recognition, and predictive policing tools. Local journalists: Reporters at news organizations nationwide — including ClickOrlando, The Richmonder, and local affiliates — used public records to map ALPR cameras in their communities, often in coordination with DeFlock's crowdsourced data. These investigations revealed that Flock data had been used for immigration enforcement, abortion-related investigations, and racial profiling. The EFF documented a case where Glendale, Arizona police used an ethnic slur as a search term in the Flock system. Throughout these investigations, the FOIA process provided the legal lever necessary to extract documents from resistant agencies, and the license plate reader data broker marketplace that emerged from the data-sharing agreements was itself a product of public records work. The journalism also revealed the human consequences of unchecked surveillance. In Texas, a sheriff's office claimed it searched the nationwide Flock network for a missing person — but the search was actually an abortion-related investigation. In Illinois, authorities found that out-of-state agencies had run over 4,000 illegal searches of the state's ALPR data for immigration enforcement purposes. These findings directly triggered many of the secrecy bills now moving through state legislatures. The Legal Gray Area ALPR data currently exists in a regulatory patchwork. Only a handful of states have ALPR-specific laws: New Hampshire requires ALPR systems to be registered with the state and mandates destruction of non-matching plate data within three minutes. Maine limits data retention to 21 days and restricts usage to law enforcement purposes. California (SB 34) bars state and local agencies from sharing ALPR data with out-of-state or federal entities. Utah requires a warrant for government entities to obtain ALPR data from non-governmental sources. Minnesota classifies captured plate data as private data under state law. Most other states treat ALPR records as discoverable under general FOIA or state open records laws — the very legal framework that the current wave of legislation seeks to dismantle. At the federal level, there is no comprehensive ALPR legislation. Occasional bills like the Facial Recognition Act have been introduced but never passed. The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether accessing historical ALPR data constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, leaving the legal status of warrantless plate tracking unresolved after Carpenter v. US. This regulatory vacuum has allowed ALPR networks to expand rapidly without meaningful oversight, making public records access the primary accountability mechanism — one that states are now systematically shutting down. A November 2025 Washington court ruling provided a rare bright spot for transparency, holding that data captured by Flock Safety cameras constitutes a public record subject to disclosure. The cities of Stanwood and Sedro-Woolley had argued that data stored on Flock's private cloud servers was not a public record unless a government employee had downloaded it. The court rejected this argument, but the ruling applies only in Washington state courts and the legislature has since passed SB 6002, which effectively overrides it. The Industry's Argument Flock Safety and other ALPR companies argue their cameras are essential public safety tools. Flock claims its systems help solve approximately 2,800 crimes per day across its network, including the recovery of stolen vehicles, location of missing persons with dementia or Alzheimer's, and resolution of AMBER alerts. The company reports crime reductions of up to 70% in some communities using its technology. The counter-argument from privacy advocates and civil liberties organizations: these benefits do not require eliminating public oversight. Audit logs, data retention limits, warrant requirements, and transparency portals can provide accountability without compromising investigative utility. The push to classify even the existence and location of surveillance cameras as state secrets is not about safety — it is about preventing the public from understanding what is being built. Even Flock's crime-solving statistics have faced scrutiny. A researcher who oversaw a Flock-funded study on the technology's effectiveness later expressed concerns about its methodology. Independent reviews have highlighted that ALPR systems have led to wrongful arrests, that Flock's own security researchers found its AI-powered cameras exposed to the internet without authentication, and that redaction errors in public records releases accidentally revealed millions of potential surveillance targets. Why This Matters Beyond ALPR The ALPR transparency crackdown is a template for surveillance expansion everywhere, following a predictable pattern: Deploy surveillance technology with private funding and minimal public oversight. When discovered through journalism and FOIA requests, claim it is for public safety. When the full scope is exposed, make the exposure illegal. This pattern is already visible in other domains. Drone surveillance, predictive policing algorithms, and Flock Safety's network itself all followed this trajectory. The ALPR open records crackdown is not an isolated event — it is a stress test for whether transparency can survive in an era where surveillance technology scales faster than the legal frameworks meant to govern it. If the surveillance industry can successfully seal ALPR records, the same playbook will be applied to every new surveillance technology that follows. The right to know what surveillance infrastructure exists in your community is not a niche transparency issue. It is the precondition for every other accountability mechanism. What You Can Do File a FOIA request with your local police department for surveillance technology agreements, data sharing policies, and audit logs. Check whether DeFlock has mapped cameras in your community. Contact your state representatives and oppose secrecy bills that exempt surveillance data from public records laws. Support organizations — the EFF, the ACLU, and local privacy coalitions — that are fighting to keep surveillance accountable to the public. Transparency is not a threat to public safety. Secrecy about surveillance is.