A group of amateur researchers with $800 worth of equipment just exposed military communications. No one was given a voice for permission. The signals were received regardless.
The Setup That Shouldn't Work
Researchers from UC San Diego and the University of Maryland spent $800 total on off-the-shelf equipment:
$185 - Satellite dish
$140 - Roof mount
$195 - Motor for positioning
$230 - Tuner card
They mounted this setup on a UC San Diego building in La Jolla, California. Over 7 months, they intercepted communications from 39 satellites—about 15% of the 590 geosynchronous satellites orbiting Earth.
What they found was... Alarming.
What Was Exposed
Cellular Backhaul (T-Mobile)
Unencrypted calls, SMS messages, user internet traffic
Hardware IDs (IMSI)
Cellular communication encryption keys
This occurred when calls were routed through cell towers in remote areas connected via satellite. T-Mobile quickly enabled encryption after disclosure.
Military and Government Communications
U.S. And Mexican military ships and units
Unencrypted VoIP and internet traffic
Unencrypted military systems with detailed tracking data for coastal vessel surveillance
Law enforcement operations, including personnel records
Aircraft and ship locations with repair schedules
In-Flight Wi-Fi
Intelsat and Panasonic providers
Passenger web browsing (DNS lookups and HTTPS traffic)
In-flight entertainment audio (news shows, sports)
Encrypted pilot flight-information systems (the only thing properly secured)
VoIP Providers
Multiple providers using unencrypted satellite backhaul exposed:
Unencrypted call audio and metadata
Caller and recipient information
Timestamps and duration data
Internal Corporate Networks
Walmart Mexico: Unencrypted internal corporate emails, sales data
Financial and banking companies: Login credentials, ATM networking information
Retail companies: Inventory records
Critical Infrastructure
Power utility companies supporting remotely operated SCADA infrastructure
Oil and gas pipelines
Power grid repair tickets
Mexican Telecommunications
TelMex and WiBo: Phone numbers for both parties, unencrypted voice data, smartphone activity (TikTok, Apple iCloud, Samsung app store access)
Mexican government agencies (military, law enforcement)
The Scale of Exposure
A single satellite transponder's data may be visible from up to 40% of Earth's surface.
Organizations believed their satellite traffic was part of their internal private network. In reality, it was being broadcast continent-wide to anyone with $800 and a rooftop.
How It Happened
Initial Setup: The team installed their satellite dish system to study how well geostationary satellite communications were encrypted
Passive Monitoring: They developed custom software to automate satellite scanning and signal decoding
Unexpected Findings: When researcher Dave Levin first intercepted private citizens' voicemails and text messages, he asked: "Did we just commit a felony? Did we just wiretap?"
Legal Confirmation: University lawyers confirmed they had broken no laws by passively receiving publicly broadcast signals
Responsible Disclosure: The team contacted affected organizations and spent months coordinating fixes
Who Fixed It
Organizations that confirmed implementing fixes:
T-Mobile (enabled encryption)
Walmart (enabled encryption)
KPU Telecom (enabled encryption)
The Bigger Picture
This isn't just about satellites. It's about a fundamental security assumption that's wrong.
Organizations assume:
"Satellite = secure by distance"
"Not on the internet = not vulnerable"
"Only we have the equipment to receive this"
The reality:
Satellite signals are broadcast continent-wide
$800 equipment can intercept them
A "cottage industry" of satellite enthusiasts already exists
No one had done a full study... Until now
The reality
The government spends billions on classified technology. Corporations spend millions on security. But they forgot to lock the back door.
The lesson is not that satellite research is exotic. It is that expensive systems still fail when basic encryption and verification are skipped.
What This Means for You
If military communications and corporate networks can be intercepted with $800 worth of equipment, what does that mean for:
Your company's satellite links?
Your government agency's communications?
Your own data when it travels via satellite?
How Organizations Should Respond
Encrypt everything on satellite links - No exceptions
Verify encryption is actually enabled - Don't assume
Audit satellite infrastructure - Regular penetration testing
Move sensitive traffic to fiber - Where possible
Assume compromise - Design for worst case
Demanding Accountability
Ask your providers: "Do you use satellite backhaul? Is it encrypted?"
Pressure vendors: Security by obscurity is not security
Support encryption: Demand end-to-end encryption for all communications
Stay informed: Subscribe to security research publications
The Researchers' Perspective
Professor Aaron Schulman stated: "We hope this work will have a long-term impact of showing that we need to have an eye in the sky to make sure any sensitive satellite communication will stay secure."
They released their custom software on GitHub: https://github.com/ucsdsysnet/dontlookup
The goal: fix the vulnerabilities before adversaries exploit them.
The public was sidelined
Governments and corporations built this infrastructure. They made assumptions about security. Communities were never asked whether sensitive data should be broadcast continent-wide, and security researchers had to prove the exposure from the outside.
Now we know better.
—-
Protect your digital privacy at theydidntask.com.
They didn't ask. We're answering anyway.